One of Musharraf’s stated reasons for the imposition of Emergency was the need for an all-out fight against rising militancy, an objective that polarises Pakistani society. Many see this as a US agenda, with the Pakistan Army being used to attack its own people. The army is already bogged down with and is suffering heavy casualties in the tribal areas of Waziristan bordering Afghanistan, where more than 1,000 soldiers have died so far. Now the battle has spread to areas of the Frontier Province, in particular the picturesque Swat valley, where local Taliban-like militants, demanding Islamic law, have taken control of up to three districts and openly begun attacking paramilitary forces.

There have recently been well-targeted deadly attacks on Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) personnel in Rawalpindi, army commandos in their training camp at Tarbela and air force personnel in Sargodha, all of which point to a sophisticated intelligence input indicative of the involvement of Al Qaeda

Musharraf may feel he needs his uniform to lead the fight against such militancy. The problem, however, is that almost no one believes that this can be rooted out through military means alone. “Military solutions alone, without any democratic alternatives for the people, are likely to exacerbate the situation,” says Talat Aslam, editor of The News in Karachi.

Questions have also been raised about the regime’s sincerity in battling extremism. Musharraf blamed the judiciary for setting free hardcore terrorists from the Lal Mosque as part of his chargesheet against the judges and claimed those set free were probably involved in extremist activities. However, the two judges primarily responsible for letting go the apprehended suspects, were among the first to take oath under the new Constitutional Order.

In the face of mounting dismay over his actions, Musharraf’s only ray of hope is absolute lack of mobilisation by political parties. While some political leaders have taken refuge in the plea that they have been placed under house arrest, observers have pointedly commented at the lack of street response from two of the most potent political forces, Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Maulana Fazlur Rahman’s Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI).

Many an eyebrow has also been raised at the fact that most of their party members have been spared arrests. While there has not been any statement from Rahman, most people are keenly looking at the cautious “wait and see” approach adopted by Bhutto, who dashed back from Dubai —where she had gone three days earlier to meet her children—hours after the proclamation of Emergency. Publicly Bhutto has condemned what she has termed “a mini-Martial Law” and called on Musharraf to hold elections. But most people are convinced there is some level of duplicity in her statements and that she is still angling for an alliance with the General that would benefit her personally.

Former Supreme Court judge Wajihuddin Ahmad, who was a presidential candidate against Musharraf in the recent presidential elections and the main appellant in the case against him as well, claims a strong PPP link in the imposition of martial rule. “General Musharraf has acted in league with the beneficiaries of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO),” he says, referring to the controversial decree that granted amnesty to Bhutto and others from corruption cases. Certainly, it had been speculated that the Supreme Court, which had taken up challenges to NRO, would strike down the Ordinance as against the principles of justice.

Bhutto, on her part, had never tried to hide her unhappiness with the judicial activism of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and her distrust of his ambitions. She was also not very pleased with her party member, current Supreme Court Bar President Aitzaz Ahsan going all out to defend Chaudhry as his lawyer and build him up as a public hero. The newly-appointed head of the apex court—Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar who replaced Chaudhry—is a judge whom she herself had appointed to the high court in 1994.

There are indications that Bhutto may still be willing to strike a deal with Musharraf in return for further political advantages. Pointing out that she was always willing to aid him in his eligibility issue by helping him pass a constitutional amendment “if he was willing to pay the political price that we demanded,” she told an American reporter that the door for negotiations was still open.

“We are talking about revival of the Constitution, up-front retirement as chief of army staff and up-front elections on schedule, announced by November 15, and held by January 15. If he is prepared to take these measures, along with some others, then we can say that all that has occurred, we will let it drop,” she told an international newsmagazine.

In fact, many political analysts have labelled Bhutto’s protests against General Musharraf’s actions as “scripted.” Veteran politician and former air marshall Asghar Khan, who heads his own small political party, claims that Bhutto will continue to make “superficial noises” against the imposition of martial rule but will

eventually join up with General Musharraf. “The exact timing of the Emergency may not have been done in consultation with Benazir,” says Aamer Ahmed Khan, BBC Online’s South Asia bureau chief based in Islamabad, “but it is highly unlikely that the decision was taken without her knowledge and acquiescence. It removed the main obstacle to Musharraf staying in power as well as the main threat to Bhutto’s political future. Their alliance is natural.”

Bhutto flew into Islamabad on November 6 reportedly for consultations with other political forces under the banner of the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy. But most analysts believe the real mission was further negotiations with the General. There is some speculation that she may even have accepted a postponement of general elections— due by January 15 under the pre-Emergency scenario—in return for greater political benefits and under the guise of battling extremism and “restoring normalcy.”

External pressure on Musharraf may make a delay in general elections —much as the ruling PML hardliners may want it—unlikely. But the lack of street protests by political parties will give him heart. Without mass mobilisation by organised political forces, the current protests are likely to flounder in the face of the harsh government crackdown. “One must remember that Musharraf’s main constituency is the army and it is unlikely to move against him unless it feels things are spiraling out of control on the streets,” says political commentator Babar Ayaz.

For the time being, Musharraf has ensured that his chosen successor, the newly appointed Vice-Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kiyani, is a loyalist and professional who is unlikely to support any move against his boss. If Musharraf does indeed take off his uniform by November 15—as he is being pressured to do by the West and Bhutto—Kiyani would succeed him as the powerful army chief. If he manages to strike a deal with Bhutto, he may yet survive in the near future, to the likely relief of his Western supporters.

But the damage that has been done to his standing and legitimacy is immense and public resentment and disgust is likely to keep bubbling beneath the surface. And as analyst I.A. Rehman quoting an age-old adage, says “acts born of such despair carry the seeds of their own destruction.”