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 Kapil Kak,
Defence Expert
Air Marshal ( Retired) Kapil Kak, currently Joint Director, Centre for Air Power Studies, Delhi-based thinktank, formerly joint director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis and Air Adviser to the Chief of Air Staff.
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| Why is India not so keen to attack the terror camps in Pakistan? |
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-Abhishek (abhishek_modi33@yahoo.com) |
Dozens of terrorist camps flourish in both PoK and the rest of Pakistan under the watchful eye of their Army and the ISI. These cannot survive otherwise. India's armed forces have full details of the camps and can easily destroy them to smithereens, especially through air strikes. But the flip side is that each camp comprises an odd firing range, obstacle - clearance area, playgrounds, prayer halls, ammunition storage, dining hall, living-in quarters and such-like structures which even if destroyed imposes no punitive costs. A camp can resurface overnight at another location. Thus other than the stunning symbolic value of India having 'done something', the effective cost-benefits of striking the camps would be questionable, There are, however, many lucrative targets for air attacks all over PoK and the rest of Pakistan, whose destruction would impose punishment on the perpetrators of 26/11 and effectively serve to teach a lesson against any future adventures. India would also need to upscale its covert operations capabilities against Pakistan which were reportedly wound down as a unilateral CBM at the Prime Minister's level sometime in 1997-98.
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| Other Q&As |
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Don’t you think that the economic sanctions against Pakistan will be much bigger threat to it than launching the military action?
-Aditya (aditya240788@gmail.com)
- While economic sanctions against Pakistan, which is on the verge of an economic implosion and collapse, would doubtless serve an immediate purpose, a far more meaningful option would be a combination of economic, diplomatic, political and coercive military pressures. These would serve as instruments of compellence for Pakistan to stop employing terrorism as a tool of foreign and security policy, in general, and specifically target Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad both of which have an India-specificity. Both these terrorist organizations are said to have very close linkages with the Pakistan Army and the ISI. Historically, economic sanctions per se - globally numbering over 150 in the last 80 years - have never worked as the targeted countries usually find alternatives/bypasses to get around the sanctions. However, if all else fails, military attacks serve as a weapon of last resort. These are focused and unambiguous, and make for a demonstrable strategic and political effect.
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Q: Why can't we act strategically to get PoK back to India?
-Priyank (priyank.dave5@gmail.com)
- Yes, acting strategically to get back PoK is theoretically possible. But why should we? It could perhaps said that there is a unanimous Parliamentary resolution of 1994 to this effect. As it happens, however, the present LoC (erstwhile Cease Fire Line) from 1947-1948 onwards was perceived as a socio-political and cultural boundary of influence of the National Conference, then led by Sheikh Abdullah, whose grandson is all set to form the new National Conference-Congress coalition government in J&K in the next few days. Ethnically too, the Mirpuri population of PoK is more akin to the Pakistani Punjabi. Only about 1.5 per cent of PoK speaks Kashmiri. On the other hand, it is the Northern Areas of Gilgit-Balistan which should have been militarily occupied in the 1947-48 War and retained. Balistan is predominantly Shia. Gilgit-Balistan has tremendous strategic significance not only by way of our crucial access to Central Asia (which bonders Gilgit) but also with regard to the China factor. The decision not to pursue this military option was indeed a strategic blunder for which India would pay the price for decades.
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Q: Isn't it high time we calculate if setting away the terrorists free was sensible to save the hostages or have we paid our price for that facing many a heinous blasts and terror carried out with the brainwork of all these very terrorists we freed some years back to count more deaths?
-Shobana (shobanasunflower@rediffmail.com)
- Shobana, you have raised a very pertinent point. The IC 814 hijacking and India's policy response in December 1999 were indeed our darkest hour from the strategic/security standpoint. Significantly, in 5 hijackings before IC 814, India held ground and did not yield to the hijackers' demands. In contrast, the NDA Government developed cold feet during the IC 814 episode. Regardless of the pressures of the hostage passengers' families and the national and international media, it should have made no concessions whatsoever. This is what strong national leadership is all about. Release of Masood Azhar (who later founded the JeM), Omar Sheikh (who subsequently got the French journalist, Daniel Pearl, be-headed) and Mushtaq Latraim (who is currently being protected by the ISI in Pakistan) exacerbated India's terrorism problems no end. The lesson has at last been driven home: India's political leadership has to exhibit nerves of steel and strong institutional capacities to withstand pressures in crisis situations thrown up by the IC814 incident (1999), Mumbai (26/11) or any other national-level crises that may confront India in future.
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Q: Shouldn’t India take strong action against Pakistan and attack the terror camps in PoK??
-Prakash (prakashdubey70@yahoo.com)
- Dozens of terrorist camps flourish in both PoK and the rest of Pakistan under the watchful eye of their Army and the ISI. These cannot survive otherwise. India's armed forces have full details of the camps and can easily destroy them to smithereens, especially through air strikes. But the flip side is that each camp comprises an odd firing range, obstacle - clearance area, playgrounds, prayer halls, ammunition storage, dining hall, living-in quarters and such-like structures which even if destroyed imposes no punitive costs. A camp can resurface overnight at another location. Thus other than the stunning symbolic value of India having 'done something', the effective cost-benefits of striking the camps would be questionable, There are, however, many lucrative targets for air attacks all over PoK and the rest of Pakistan, whose destruction would impose punishment on the perpetrators of 26/11 and effectively serve to teach a lesson against any future adventures. India would also need to upscale its covert operations capabilities against Pakistan which were reportedly wound down as a unilateral CBM at the Prime Minister's level sometime in 1997-98.
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| Join the War on Terror today |
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| You can also |
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SMS ‘WAR’ to52424
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| In case you come across any suspicious activity or have any information to tell the Anti-Terror Squad, |
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| Dial All India Toll-Free
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| Terror Helpline No.1090
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| The identity of the caller will be kept a secret.
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Here's a list of emergency numbers and addresses in 6 important cities.
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We bring together stories, videos and pictures on terror attacks across the nation.
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India Reacts
The prime purpose of the terrorists is to shatter the peace and unity of the country. The only way to defeat them is by defeating their mindless purpose-- stand with determined resilience with the people of the country irrespective of communal, linguistic and regional barriersn.
Swarnima Bhattacharya
, Lucknow
Much has been spoken by the leaders, but no concrete work has been done so far. The ministry should not be headed by any politician but by some retired police or preferably some military official.
Shailendra Vikrant , Chandigarh
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Headlines Today anchors pledge to fight terror
Are we safe anywhere?
